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Th e rail sector in Europe like other network industries 
is in a process of organizational restructuring that is part 
of diff erent forms of liberalisation as well as de- and re-
regulation. In this process many approaches to railway 
regulation are reassessed. Achieving more, better and more 
cost effi  cient rail services for freight and passengers is a 
commonly shared goal, but there are diff erent opinions 
on the right policies to achieve this goal. Th is issue of the 
Network Industries Quarterly will look at diff erent aspects 
of rail regulation with examples from in and outside the 
European Union.
On the example of the Swiss rail reform Desmaris looks 
at the relationship between competition and performance. 
Kuligowska describes the recent reforms that the Polish 
rail regulator had to undertake when dealing with open 
access provision. Laroche discusses the issue of congestion 
of railway lines and how saturation of rail infrastructure 
can be modelled. Th iebaud & Amaral look at how prices 
infl uence coordination in the rail sector. Peña-Alcaraz et 
al. present an alternative view on capacity pricing in open 
access rail systems on the case of Tanzania.
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Located in the heart of the European network, 
Switzerland, although not a member of the European 
Union (EU), has recently conducted a major railway re-
form. This Swiss railway reform, in part inspired by the 
proposals of the EU, but also largely specific, raises many 
issues. What is the institutional design of these reforms? 
What are the results? How have these successes been obtai-
ned? What can be learned from Switzerland’s example? It 
seems that more performance can be obtained without the 
need for more competition.
1. What is the institutional design of these reforms?
Swiss railway reform may be divided into three stages: 
the «Revision of the federal law on railways» (Railways 
Act) in 1996; the «Railway Reform 1», with broader scope, 
in 1999; and, from 2005, the «Railway Reform 2».
1) The first stage - 1996: regional traffic reform 
The Swiss rail reform began with a new governance of 
the regional passenger transport. This first reform (LCdF, 
March 24th 1995) was based on three principles which 
had deeply transformed the relationship between the rai-
lway undertakings and public authorities (Genoud, 2000). 
The most important measure provides that public autho-
rities will pay only for the services agreed in advance and 
for the amount clearly defined by the contract. Unplanned 
deficits will no longer be covered by the State. Secondly, 
the cantonal authorities become fully responsible for the 
regional transport services; however their decision-making 
autonomy remained supervised by the Federal Office of 
Transport (FOT). Thirdly, SBB’s monopoly on regional 
and national long distance railway passenger services is 
cancelled. But for the moment, the cantonal authorities 
do not solicit the contest procedure and no new foreign 
supplier has entered this market. The national passenger 
transport is commissioned by the Confederation; it is cur-
rently provided by SBB.
2) The second stage - 1999: a new regulatory fra-
mework to comply with European legislation
A further step was achieved with the “Railway Reform 
1” (LCdf, March 20th 1998). Its prior objective was to 
transpose the principles of the Directive 91/440/EEC 
into the Swiss law, according to the Agreement on Land 
Transport (1999). This reform has significantly renewed 
SBB’s organization and its business model. The direct au-
thority of the federal administration over SBB has been 
abolished and the national railway company was submit-
ted to a multi-annual contract. To allow this newly created 
company to operate without the burdens of the past, the 
Confederation has accepted to erase its debts.
3) Since 2005, Railways Reform 2: controversial and 
incomplete
In 2005, the Government presented a further rail pac-
kage to the Parliament, the so-called “Railway Reform 
2”, which aimed to transpose the content of the First and 
Second EU Railway Packages into Swiss law. This legisla-
tion included several measures about various topics, such 
as how to finance the rail infrastructure, how to establish 
a regulatory authority and how to improve safety in pu-
blic transport. But as the Parliament rejected the bill, the 
Government decided to split up the package into sepa-
rate, more focused bills (CER, 2011). The first part of this 
reform related to the railway system regulation, to safety 
and to the ordering period in regional transport (from one 
to every two years) entered into force in 2010. The second 
part of the Railway Reform 2, submitted for consultation 
in 2009, was presented to the Parliament in 2011. Some 
texts are now adopted; some of them entered into force 
and others are still under discussion. 
Overall, the Swiss railway legislation developments 
show a pragmatic reform, step by step. If the principle of 
competition is introduced for the freight traffic, we ob-
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serve for the passenger traffic that the «Swiss model» differs 
from the standard promoted by the Commission, based 
on market competition between operators. This model is 
more akin to a particular type of governance involving pu-
blic authorities, rail companies (and public transport com-
panies more broadly) and travelers, than to a true change 
in the market structure, based on more open competition. 
Unlike a “on the market” liberalization and compe-
tition between operators, it is more a special governance 
between the public authorities and the railway compa-
nies, rather than an overhaul of the market structure on 
a wider competition. Some describe the Swiss rail struc-
ture as a “hybrid system” that combines  liberalization and 
integration (Finger, Holterman, 2013; Maier-Gyomlay, 
2013) and only partly conforms to European law and its 
philosophy.
2. What are the results? 
Swiss rail reform of passenger transport had two posi-
tive outcomes: more efficiency in the use of public money 
and better and more services provided to passengers. 
1) More efficient use of public funds
The most decisive result, a driving force behind the re-
form, has been the inversion of the trend whereby public 
compensation contributions steadily rose for regional traf-
fic (Table 1). SBB have managed, with a constant volume 
of public funding, to regularly increase both the number 
of kilometers on offer and passenger traffic.
2) Higher quality services for rail passengers
The second result of the rail reform is the significant 
improvement in the quality of services for passenger rail. 
Switzerland is traditionally known for the excellence of its 
railways (Bovy, 1992). Intermodality has reached unsur-
passed levels, linking together all constituent parts of the 
Swiss public transport network. Service frequency is the 
highest in the world, setting Switzerland ahead of Japan.
The reform of the railways has led to two other satis-
fying results for travelers: increased commercial speed and 
more trains. The bulk of speed improvements took place 
between 1994 and 2005, following implementation of the 
broad investment and modernization program called «Rail 
2000». Rail 2000 significantly improved the attractiveness 
of passenger rail by more train frequency (basically eve-
ry 30 minutes and 15 minutes on the busiest routes, on 
peak hours) and by better correspondences between rail 
and other modes of transport. The increase of supply is 
another key factor in quality improvement. Measured in 
train-kilometers, the total SBB supply for travelers shows a 
considerable increase: 55.4% since the reform. This is one 
of the biggest increases in all of Europe.
3. How have these successes been leveraged? 
We believe the performance gains obtained by Swiss 
rail should mainly be ascribed to the nature of their public 
governance, which tends to bring together all stakeholders 
in the rail system.
1) The first key to success: public governance promo-
ting sustainable mobility centered on the railway system
The main reason for the success of Swiss rail reform 
lies in its particular form of public governance that aims 
to promote sustainable mobility based on train travel. We 
consider in this note three characteristics.
•	 A	collective	choice	to	foster	rail	 transport	based	
on a high level of infrastructure investment.
After having supported road, Swiss transport policy 
faced a major reorientation in favor of railways from the 
mid-80. Its maintained and updated national choice in 
favor of rail transport translates into sustained high level 
of investment programs. The earliest, “Rail 2000”, passed 
in December 1987, was to be undertaken in 1994 and 
Table 1: Public subsidies paid to SBB for regional passenger transport (calculated from SBB Management Reports)
dossier
1993 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2013
Million of Swiss francs (CHF) in 
current value 725 546 507 522 552 571 556 575 591
Index, basis 100 in 2000 - 100.0 92.9 95.7 101.2 104.6 101.9 105.4 108.3
Swiss francs by train-kilometer in 
current value N.A. 10.2 8.9 8.1 7.6 8.1 7.6 7.7 7.8
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finished in 2004. It has been extended by a second railways 
investment program, called “ZEB”, whose realization star-
ted in 2004 and should be spread out until 2022. In addi-
tion, a more controversial third program aims at creating 
a New Rail Link through the Alps (so called “NRLA”), 
by the digging of two new tunnels (the Gothard and the 
Lötschberg) to be able to carry freight in a more environ-
mentally friendly way.
•	 Local	 authorities	 are	 increasingly	 implicated	 in	
decision-making and funding.
The Swiss rail reform included a process of decentrali-
zation that is manifested in two facts: the cantons have full 
responsibility over decisions regarding provided services, 
including offer consistency, which, in return, are funded 
by local public funds. As a result, the Confederation share 
to financing the regional passenger traffic decreased dras-
tically (from 65% in 2003 to 50% today, as stipulated in 
the Act).
•	 SBB	 corporate	 governance	 to	 enhance	 motiva-
tion and increase accountability. 
The reform renewed SBB’s governance on two aspects: 
the introduction of clear, precise, demanding and strictly 
controlled strategic objectives and a mandatory adherence 
to drastic financial constraints. Firstly, SBB’s activities are 
carried out within the framework of a four-year contract, 
called the «Service agreement» which requires a constant 
improvement in the quality of services and in terms of 
efficiency gains in the use of public funds. Secondly, the 
Federal strategy seeks to maintain the real value of the 
public operating funds allocated to SBB at a stable level, 
while increasing demands in terms of targets to be reached. 
The logic clearly being followed is to «do more with less».
2) The second key to success: an incumbent operator 
capable of considerable productivity gains and sweeping 
innovations in organization 
The explicit aims of SBB are to systematically keep 
operating and production costs down and to seek new 
revenues wherever possible (Genoud, 2000).
•	 To	seek	and	find	significant	productivity	gains
SBB must grow while reducing costs. Measured in 
terms of apparent labor productivity, the gains are subs-
tantial, despite the negative impact of the crisis on traf-
fic, especially on freight (Table 2). This sharp productivity 
rise breaks with earlier trends, although there was growth 
before. These productive efficiency gains in Switzerland, 
contrary to many other European railways, are based more 
on a sensible increase in passenger and freight traffics than 
on staff reductions (Desmaris, 2010).
•	 To	increase	railway	company	revenues
Following the railway reform, SBB orientated their 
activity towards their customers, both to improve quality 
and to increase the railway earnings. Good results have 
been achieved. Thus, between 2002 and 2011, while the 
passenger traffic income has increased by 52%, SBB total 
government subsidies have grown by only 19.7%. The 
total general expenses for this period have registered an 
increase of 22.2% (with 17.6% of personnel expenses), 
smaller than the incomes growth. As a result, the operating 
income (EBIT) has improved from CHF 194 million to 
CHF 530 million in current value (SBB, 2014b).
We also observe that SBB have developed a particular 
active policy with regards to their real estate assets. SBB 
are indeed among the major players in the Swiss real estate 
market, with a book value of about 4 billion Swiss Francs 
(especially around stations) for a turnover of nearly CHF 
698 million in 2013.The business unit “Real estate” now 
provides an essential contribution to the overall financial 
health of the railway company being the most profitable of 





Passenger-kilometer in millions 
(1) 9,167 11,712 17,749 +27.8 +51.6
Ton- kilometer in millions (2) 7,220 8,156 12,346 +13.0 +51.4
Staff in full-time equivalent, ex-
cept subsidiaries (3) 38,367 33,529 25,840 -12.6 -22.9
Labor productivity - million traf-
fic units (4) 0.43 0.59 1.16 +38.7 +96.6
Table 2: Changes in SBB traffic, staffing and productivity (calculated from the UIC statistics)
NB. (4) = [(1) + (2)] / (3). Based on the hypothesis that a passenger-kilometer is equivalent to a ton-kilometer.
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3) The third key to success: the strong support of 
consumers and citizens
The satisfaction expressed by travelers and citizen 
and their support for the rail reforms carried out by the 
Confederation are important elements of their success.
The passenger satisfaction is expressed by an upward 
trend in passenger traffic with an overall increase for SBB 
travelers is 51.8% since the reform, expressed in terms of 
passenger-kilometers. This trend is the highest in Europe 
after the United Kingdom, with more than 2,250 km per 
capita on average. Another relevant indicator is loyalty: 
one in two adults is a regular SBB customer and has a 
subscription (usually half price or with a community ta-
riff) and their number has significantly increased after the 
reform.
One must also mention the deep commitment the 
Swiss citizens express towards their railway system and 
the policies carried out on their behalf. Each of the major 
stages in Swiss transport policy was submitted to a popular 
vote.
Conclusion - What can be learned from Switzerland’s 
example?
We conclude this note with three lessons taught by the 
analysis of the Swiss railway passenger reform.
1) Although it is said to be modeled on the reforms 
instigated by the Commission, detailed analysis shows that 
the Swiss railway reform has its own particularities and ap-
pears to have reached its stated objectives. Switzerland has 
obviously chosen to increase the railway system efficacy 
and efficiency by prescribing an original form of gover-
nance in opting for cooperation between the actors, rather 
than in submitting it to competition forces (CER, 2011; 
Nash, 2011; Finger and Holterman, 2013). The Swiss rai-
lway reforms have imposed a «stress performance» to the 
national incumbent rail operator, and more generally to 
all public transport companies, generalizing a contractual 
agreement. The regional passenger traffic, conceded by 
the cantons to SBB, is a typical example of this type of 
governance.
2) The high quality rail transport has a major financial, 
political and managerial cost for the Community. First 
of all, the high quality railway services involve a signifi-
cant financial effort from the taxpayers, with no equiva-
lent anywhere else. Secondly, a political cost: to maintain 
this high quality level, the government must engage in an 
everlasting and strong involvement as «major assembler» 
of the public transport system, especially through the tasks 
entrusted to the FOT. Thirdly, it also induces a managerial 
cost: as sole shareholder of the historical railway company, 
the Swiss government should fully assume their role as 
owners.
3) The sustainability of such a model is uncertain. 
The constant search for savings and productivity gains is 
reducing the sustainability of the rail system, both from 
a technical point of view (disinvestment limiting future 
improvements in traffic) and from a social one (access to 
services). The sustained increase in traffic, which has excee-
ded expectations, within a network where use levels were 
already very high, means substantial infrastructure main-
tenance requirements. The slight increase in public contri-
butions for regional transport also illustrates the limits of 
the quest for the efficient use of public funds. 
All in all, Swiss railway reform deserves more consi-
deration and further studies. A careful examination of its 
specificities would probably show that it would not be an 
easy model to replicate in other national contexts. In the 
matter of railways, progress might be slow, gradual and 
highly path-dependent. This simply does not exclude in-
cremental changes. 
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Introduction 
This article presents the main regulatory challenges in 
ensuring open and non-discriminatory access to the rail 
infrastructure in Poland. While many of those might be re-
garded as similar to the problems of the regulatory regimes 
of the rail sector in other countries of the European Union, 
this paper will focus on the unique solutions adopted by 
the Polish rail regulator (Urząd Transportu Kolejowego, 
UTK). The rail sector in Poland is undergoing rapid and 
significant changes mainly due to the introduction of the 
EU competition regime, which places the rail regulator in 
a position that requires very careful balancing of the vital 
interests of all market actors. UTK’s mostly pragmatic atti-
tude to the regulation of the access and the strong commit-
ment to the introduction of a competition regime resulted 
in the application of a few procedures allowed within the 
Polish legal framework: the decisions of the President of 
the UTK replacing rail infrastructure access contracts; the 
open access to the internal market of the rail passenger 
services; and the development of the contractual penalty 
arrangements for  delays on the network.
1. Decisions of the President of the UTK repla-
cing rail infrastructure access contracts 
The Railway Transport Act (Ustawa 2003) empowers 
the President of the UTK with significant competences 
in the supervision of contracts between the infrastructure 
manager and the rail operators on the access to the rail 
infrastructure. These provisions envisage an active role 
of the President of the UTK in the negotiation process 
between contracting parties and ultimately, in the absence 
of a conclusive agreement, the possibility for the President 
of the UTK of issuing its own decision which in effect 
replaces the contract. 
The introduction of such deep changes in comparison 
with the original wording of the Act was deemed necessary 
in order to regulate the position and the powers of the 
President of the UTK in a similar manner to the other 
sectoral regulatory bodies, and to allow the President of 
the UTK to regulate all aspects of the access to the rail 
infrastructure in execution of his supervisory powers over 
the rail market (Wierzbowski and Wajda 2014: 544). 
Aside from the enforcement of regulatory control and the 
enforcement of equal rights of access for all rail operators, 
there were practical reasons for the introduction of these 
provisions. Among them there were recurring complica-
tions during the negotiation processes and successive leng-
thening of periods of time in which these contracts were 
not concluded. 
In the execution of his supervisory powers over the 
access to the rail infrastructure, the President of the UTK 
is allowed to conduct proceedings on the negotiation and 
the conclusion of the infrastructure access contract, to 
approve the dissolution of the access contract and to sanc-
tion the conclusion of the framework agreement. In the 
proceedings on the negotiation and the conclusion of the 
infrastructure access contract, the President of the UTK 
is empowered to impose an obligation of conducting the 
negotiations on the access contract, oblige the parties to 
conduct the negotiations with the participation of the re-
presentatives of the Office, specify the date of the conclu-
sion of the negotiations, and issue the decision replacing 
infrastructure access contract. During the supervision over 
the dissolution of the access contract, the President of the 
UTK has to consent to the termination of the contract. 
In the proceedings sanctioning the conclusion of the fra-
mework agreement the approval of the President of the 
UTK is gained if such a contract is justified by the exis-
ting long term trade agreements and executed or planned 
investments (for a period longer than five years), if services 
are using specialized rail infrastructure which requires long 
term investments (15 years) or where such investments are 
covered by contractual commitments including a long 
term amortization schedule (for a period longer than 15 
years), and if the provisions of the framework agreement 
Current regulatory challenges in access to the rail 
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do not limit the use of the railway line by other rail opera-
tors (Urząd Transportu Kolejowego 2014). 
2. Compensation scheme for rail operators 
Due to increased investments in the infrastructure car-
ried out by the main infrastructure manager in Poland, the 
PKP PLK, many complaints on disturbances and increased 
costs of the access to the rail infrastructure were submitted 
to the UTK both from passenger and freight operators. 
The problems reported by the rail operators to the UTK 
in 2011 included the increased costs of train path replace-
ment, the necessity to provide additional resources, signi-
ficantly longer travel times leading to constant changes in 
timetables. The President of the UTK acting on his own 
initiative imposed an obligation on the infrastructure 
manager and the rail operators to agree upon the ade-
quate compensation scheme. Relevant provisions were in-
cluded in the decisions replacing rail infrastructure access 
contracts for the 2011/12 timetable.  
The negotiations of the rail operators and the infras-
tructure manager were held with the participation of the 
representatives of the UTK in September 2012. According 
to the proposals of the rail operators, in case of distur-
bances on the network as were then occurring, the ope-
rator should be able to determine the length of the com-
mercial stop, which is normally left for the infrastructure 
manager to decide. Moreover, the difference between tra-
vel time predicted in the timetable and the total sum of 
time periods of actual travel, operating reserves and total 
length of commercial stops should  not exceed 5%. If the 
admissible travel time is exceeded, the affected rail ope-
rator should receive a paid compensation for any excess 
minute of the journey. The extension of the travel time 
schedule developed by the rail operators is to be approved 
as binding. Ultimately the infrastructure manager infor-
med the UTK and the operators in November 2012 that 
due to the financial constrains the introduction of a com-
pensation scheme to the infrastructure access contracts for 
2012/2013 was not possible. 
Therefore, the President of the UTK decided to inter-
vene. Following a detailed analysis, the President of the 
UTK concluded that, although necessary and justified, 
the investments carried out by the PKP PLK should have 
not imposed an additional financial burden (increased 
charges) on the rail operators. Moreover, the increase in 
costs of the operations had an obvious negative impact 
on the competitiveness of  rail transport and encouraged 
modal shift. Thus, to limit these tendencies and reduce the 
impact on both passenger and freight operators, a twofold 
compensation scheme was introduced. 
For rail passenger transport the scheme was designed to 
limit the profit margin of the infrastructure manager when 
the amended timetable was applied. The cancellation of 
the allocated train paths by the infrastructure manager was 
subjected to a special regulation regime. Separate rules for 
levying of charges for allocation of replacement train paths 
were also imposed. Finally, the financial compensation for 
the cost of providing replacement bus transport was envi-
saged. For rail freight transport the scheme included the 
predefining of routes and the compensation for allocating 
replacement train paths longer than 50 km as compared 
to predefined ones. The compensation was to be settled 
by the reduction of the infrastructure manager’s profit 
margin. These provisions were included in the decisions of 
the President of the UTK replacing infrastructure access 
contracts for the 2012/2013 timetable.   
The development of contractual penalty arrangements 
for causing the delays on the network, so that delays im-
posed by one train operator on another require penalty 
payment, is another example that the intervention of the 
regulatory body might be required. This kind of arrange-
ments initially agreed between the infrastructure manager 
and the rail operating companies remained optional until 
it became clear that freight operators were less likely to 
join the scheme than passenger services operators as they 
were not so tightly bound by the time factor. Therefore the 
intervention of the rail regulator became necessary, resul-
ting in uniform application of the arrangements to all rail 
operators.  
3. ‘Internal’ open access 
In January 2014 the UTK introduced the procedure 
for granting open access for any rail operator that intends 
to run passenger services on a commercial basis (Urząd 
Transportu Kolejowego 2013). Under Polish law the 
operation of rail services is possible when the services are 
operated under a public service contract (PSC) or when a 
positive decision concerning open access right is granted. 
Polish internal open access differs from open access regu-
lated in EU law as as it only looks at domestic and not 
international rail services. 
The basic element in this procedure is a two-step ana-
lysis of the impact of the proposed new service on the eco-
nomic conditions of the services operated under PSC (run 
on the same routes in similar time periods). The first step 
in this analysis is the verification if there is a substantial 
change in the value of the public service contract, which 
dossier
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implies that services operated under PSC might no longer 
be sustainable and generating a reasonable level of ope-
rating profit. Thus the economic equilibrium of a public 
service contract is regarded as compromised if the new ser-
vice might have negative consequences for the profitability 
of the PSC services or the net cost for the authority which 
concluded the contract. 
The verification of the impact of the proposed new 
service on the services operated under PSC is conducted 
according to the following scheme: the comparison of the 
nature of the services, the estimation of the geographical 
coverage of the services, the comparison of the timing and 
frequency of the services, the determination of the amount 
of the compensation paid for the operators of the rail ser-
vices under the PSC for the duration of the contracts, the 
estimation of the share of the revenues generated by the 
PSC services in the compensation paid under the contract 
(10% threshold), the verification of the possibility of total 
loss of revenues generated by the PSC services (crowding 
out of the service from the route), and subsequent eva-
luation of the rationale behind the relevant public service 
contract as a contract concluded to supply transport ser-
vices which would not be run under market conditions.   
On the basis on this preliminary analysis the assess-
ment of the possible impact of the decision on granting 
open access to the proposed new service on the economic 
equilibrium of the PSC is formulated. Thus, either it is 
stated that the new service might impact on the economic 
equilibrium of the relevant PSC in adverse manner or such 
impact is not determined. 
Then, if the possibility of an adverse impact is antici-
pated, the regulator is obliged to conduct a supplementary 
analysis in which two criteria of evaluation are conside-
red. First, the negative impact on the regularity of the ser-
vice under PSC is assessed by comparing the timetables 
of both services operated on the same route and the type 
of the rolling stock used. If a disruptive effect of the new 
open access service on the frequency of the PSC service by 
addressing the same passenger market segment is proved, 
this in part constitutes a prerequisite for rejection of the 
applicant’s request. 
Then, the second criterion is considered. On the basis 
of calculations provided by the authorities that awarded 
the relevant public service contracts, the cumulative effect 
of the operation of the new open access service on the spe-
cified route on the public services is estimated. Thus, the 
overall change in the level of the compensation paid to the 
PSC operators is determined. If the level of compensations 
is not changed or rises below 10% and, in result, it does 
not compromise the economic equilibrium of the relevant 
services, the open access is granted to the operator of the 
new service. If the level of compensations rises above 10%, 
the possibility of rejection the applicant’s request or gran-
ting the access in a limited scope is considered. 
The final decision also depends on factors which, al-
though not purely financial, might benefit the passengers 
in the short and medium term. In particular the possibility 
of widening the range of rail services offered on the routes 
with significant potential or providing additional services 
on the routes with deficit related problems should be ta-
ken into account. Moreover, the quality criteria are worth 
consideration as additional supply of services might lead 
to the reduction of  ticket prices while maintaining or even 
raising the level of services. It might also be argued that 
the introduction of new services could result in a more 
effective use of available capacity or act as an incentive for 
investments in rail infrastructure. 
Depending on the results of the analysis described 
above, there are three resolutions possible. The open access 
for the applying operator of the new service is granted if 
such decision might have a positive impact on the deve-
lopment of the market and thus on the supply of the rail 
services. If the estimated effect of the introduction of the 
new service could be limited to only taking over the same 
segment of the passenger market with consequent increase 
of the compensation paid by the contracting authorities, 
the access is denied. Finally, if the evaluation indicates that 
the positive and negative effects might balance each other 
out, the access might be granted within certain limits. Due 
to the multiannual perspective in which these conditions 
are considered, it should be noted that such analysis is in 
essence only an approximation. 
Conclusion  
In recent years it became clear that, in order to remain 
effective as a sectoral regulator, the Polish regulatory body 
in exercise of his regulatory and supervisory functions 
had to adopt a very flexible and pragmatic approach. In 
constant challenge of continuous adjustments of the re-
gulatory framework to requirements of the changing rail 
market, fast reaction of the regulator to arising problems 
seemed crucial to maintain overall competitiveness of the 
sector. The creation of fair conditions for commercial acti-
vity was backed by a growing acceptance of market actors 
that the regulator is effectively overseeing the market and 
is ready to take action when needed. This led to improved 
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stability and predictability of the rail market in Poland.  
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The congestion phenomenon remains a poorly-resear-
ched issue in railway studies (Brunel et al., 2013). Well-
known in road transport, socio-economic interest in stu-
dying congestion has been reinforced in the railway sector 
in the process of market opening from the 1980’s, suppor-
ted by the European Commission. The EC/91/440 direc-
tive introduces as the fundamental principle the access 
right to infrastructure and addresses the issue of capacity 
allocation. Capacity is a complex concept to apprehend in 
the railway sector because of the diversity of stakeholders 
and networks (Abril and al., 2008)
This issue is currently researched in France on the case 
of the Paris-Lyon High-Speed Line (HSL). Being the first 
historical line of the French high-speed network, it is also 
the most used one in 2014. According to the infrastructure 
manager, the anticipated traffic evolution could lead to its 
saturation as soon as 2020-2025 (RFF, 2011). The solu-
tion considered by the National Transport Infrastructure 
Scheme (SNIT, 2011) is to build a new line to relieve the 
existing one. The project, for which costs are estimated at 
14 billion€, raises the questions of its economic relevance 
in a context of scarce public funds and of possible alterna-
tives of adaptation of capacity to demand increases. 
This paper suggests an analytic framework of the sa-
turation of transport infrastructure, applied to the Paris-
Lyon case study. The objective is two-fold: how to concep-
tualise the saturation of a high-speed line? Which levers to 
increase its capacity?
A definition of saturation is proposed in the first part. 
The second part introduces the saturation assessment me-
thod, and the last section explores the alternatives for a 
possible adaptation of the capacity.
Which type of saturation?
Saturation can be defined by an utilisation rate measu-
ring the relationship between demand and supply for an 
infrastructure. 
Two rationales can be distinguished:
- The infrastructure managers’ for whom the de-
mand is expressed in trains and the supply in the “number 
of trains that can circulate on a given section, in a given 
time” (Burdett and Kozan, 2006);
- The operator’s rationale for which the demand is 
expressed in users and supply in number of seats in a train.
As a result, saturation might be considered as between 
users or between trains (Brunel and al., 2013).
Considering infrastructure, the literature identifies two 
types of capacity: 
- The absolute or theoretical capacity (Ct) ,, being 
the maximum number of trains that can circulate on the 
infrastructure (Burdett and Kozan, 2006); 
- The practical or commercial capacity (Cp), that 
considers the effective capacity of the infrastructure (Liotta 
and al., 2009). 
The difference between them is the resilience of the 
system, meaning its capacity of recovering a normal func-
tioning after a traffic disruption (Setra, 2009). It puts the 
infrastructure manager in a judge position between the 
capacity offer and the targeted level of quality of service. 
The econometric analysis demonstrates a non-linear rela-
tion between traffic density and delay risks (Brunel and 
al., 2013). In contrast to road, delay is not factual and is 
expressed as a risk (planned activity). From a certain thres-
hold, it increases exponentially for a supplementary circu-
lation. The threshold usually stands for a risk of below 10 
minutes delay.
As a consequence two levels of saturation can be consi-
dered for the infrastructure: 
- A “structural” saturation (S2) based on the theo-
retical capacity, including heavy investments on both mid- 
and long-terms; 
- A “daily” saturation (S1) linked to the commer-
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cial capacity resulting in the system performance and the 
trade-off made by the infrastructure manager.
The disaggregation of the different capacity levels leads 
to the identification of the train capacity and the commer-
cial strategy of the operator(s). This capacity has a bias for 
the infrastructure manager who only has an indirect link 
with the demand, as expressed in travellers. The operator 
manages its capacity in terms of available seats per train, 
under typical technical and comfort constraints, but also 
in terms of frequency, under the constraint of the capacity 
made available by the infrastructure manager. 
This deeper study of the saturation concept highlights 
several capacity thresholds and a strong interaction 
between the different stakeholders. However, they all cor-
respond to very distinct rationales that are even clearer in 
an unbundled system.
Which assessment method for saturation?
The assessment method of saturation is adapted to a 
French-model based high-speed line. Traffic is recognized 
as being homogeneous both in terms of speed and service. 
Only passenger high-speed trains have the possibility to 
circulate on the network. 
The utilisation rate (Ru) is calculated according to the 
theoretical capacity of the infrastructure section (an entry/
exit). It is the ratio between demand in terms of passengers 
and offer in terms of available seats. 
The demand (D) is calculated on peak-hours regarding 
the concentration coefficient (ϕ). This coefficient enables 
to assess the demand concentration during peak-hours in 
comparison to off-peak hours. 
Supply (C) is calculated regarding the maximal capa-
city of train, expressed as the number of seats (Cr) and 
the theoretical capacity of the infrastructure (Ct) expressed 
as the number of trains per hour. The train capacity is 
weighted by the load factor (ϕ) and the double train rate 
(μ). The theoretical capacity is weighted by the resilience 
coefficient (k) to result in the commercial capacity (Cp). 
Supply is divided by the number of commercial exploita-
tion hours (h) during a year.
Infrastructure is a priori saturated when the utilisa-
tion rate is higher than 100% to the theoretical capacity. 
However, saturation is considered, in this analysis, accor-
ding to the commercial capacity. It shows an increasing 
tension in the system between demand to satisfy and the 
purposes for regularity.
Application to the Paris-Lyon HSL
Regarding the Paris-Lyon HSL, the method assesses the 
horizon of saturation of the commercial capacity as being 
up to 2020-2025 (between 75 and 80% of the theoretical 
capacity). The reference year is 2008, and the hypotheses 
of demand and offer are based on studies undertaken by 
RFF (2011) in the context of public debate about the 
project of doubling the line by creating a new line Paris-
Orleans-Clermont-Ferrand-Lyon (POCL).
In 2008, the effective demand was up to 38 million 
passengers. The central scenario foresees a rise of 39% in 
2020 (53 million passengers) and of 115% in 2050 (83 
million passengers). This dynamic is due to the expected 
30% of economic growth and 70% of the development of 
the HSL network, according to the SNIT (2011).
The supply situation in 2008 is as follows: the average 
theoretical capacity of the circulating trains is up to 450 
passengers. This result considers the Duplex trains offering 
512 seats and the first generation of HST (377 seats), still 
circulating to Switzerland. The observed double train rate 
is of 1.3 during peak-hours and the average load factor is 
up to 80%. The network operability is of 18h/day (5:30 
– 23:30). The theoretical capacity is up to 16 trains/hour, 
in accordance with the signalling system (TVM 300) for a 
commercial capacity of up to 12 trains/hour (75% of the 
theoretical capacity). Eventually, the concentration coeffi-
cient is estimated at 1.5.
Which ways to adapt capacity? 
Regarding the saturation risk, since 2007 the public ac-
tors have been calling for the doubling of the line (POCL 
project). This solution would lead to the doubling of the 
theoretical capacity (+100%) and to the improvement of 
the exploitation of the Paris-Lyon corridor, thanks to the 
redundancy of the route (Leboeuf, 2014). The deadline 
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of saturation is postponed beyond 2050 for a commissio-
ning start date in 2025. Nevertheless, this lever raises two 
main controversial issues. On one hand, the cost is esti-
mated at 14 billion€ and would stand for a record among 
all HSL projects (SNIT, 2011). On the other hand, the 
saturation risk might be postponed from the line towards 
Lyon railway hub, which opens to question the issue of the 
re-planning of the main interconnectivity stations and its 
financing scheme. 
Out of the infrastructure, four means of adaptation 
can be identified: three technical levers (exploitation, traf-
fic management and rolling stock) and one economical le-
ver (pricing). Each lever is characterised by the parameters 
of the previous equation. 
The tested hypotheses are the results of current expe-
riences. Their generalisation could be effective at the hori-
zon 2025.
The rolling stock lever: solution “Ouigo”
This scenario proposes to test the “high density TGV” 
principle, according to the experience currently under-
taken by SNCF (Ouigo offer). It increases the existing 
train density through the generalisation of the second 
class standard. This type of solution applied to the whole 
commercial offer on the Paris-Lyon line could lead to a 
capacity gain at least as important as the doubling of the 
infrastructure (+131%). The lever of this hypothesis relies 
on an average capacity per train of 600 seats. This esti-
mation takes into consideration the increasing of capacity 
of Duplex trains (634 seats) and the replacement of the 
first generation of HST by AGV 10 trains (462 seats). The 
double train rate is up to 2 (optimisation of the rolling 
stock management) and the load factor up to 90% (opti-
misation of sales and tickets booking).
However, while this scenario seems to be credible on 
a technical standpoint, it raises the issue of the operator’s 
ability to evolve the business model which is until now 
focused on the first-class and comfortable seats spacing. 
Similar to the airway model, this evolution involves a new 
conception of high-speed and services.
The traffic management lever: the solution of an 
optimised schedule
This scenario suggests to testing the adaptation of the 
daily capacity on the basis of a better traffic management. 
The resilience can be improved on the model of the new 
schedule, defined by RFF in 2013 after the opening of the 
Rhin Rhone HSL (Deborde, 2012). The commercial capa-
city is, so far, up to 13 trains/hour (80% of its capacity) 
during a peak-hour in a week (Friday evening). The gene-
ralization of a schedule optimization could increase the 
capacity by 13% and postpone the saturation horizon by 
5 to 15 years. To achieve such a scenario, the effort must 
be made on the solidity of the circulation schedule, the 
management real-time tools and the ability to deal with 
disruptive situations. Without any significant change, the 
increase of the commercial capacity might damage regula-
rity and raise the delay risk.
The exploitation lever: the ERTMS 2 solution
The exploitation scenario tests the effect of an in-
crease of the theoretical capacity by introducing the new 
European signalling standard ERTMS level 2, in replace-
ment of the existing (TVM 300). This standard is known 
to allow a better traffic management in real time by because 
of a shorter interval between trains and a better resilience 
of the system (Delaborde, 2012). The theoretical capacity 
is up to 20 trains/hour for a corresponding commercial ca-
pacity of 16 trains/hour (80% of the theoretical capacity).
The capacity gain is of 33% and the saturation deadline 
postponed by 15 to 25 years. This scenario enables a grea-
ter capacity on the line without any particular optimisa-
dossier
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tion of the offer to be made by the operator. Nevertheless, 
the estimated cost is 500 million€ equally shared by 
the infrastructure manager and the dominant operator 
(Leboeuf, 2014). The necessary communication between 
the on-track installation and the cabin to make the system 
operational requires coordination in investments. Guihery 
and Laroche (2013) have demonstrated that there might 
be several barriers to migration if the historical operator 
does not align its choice to the infrastructure manager.
The pricing lever: the congestion economics solution
The last lever possible relies on the principle of railway 
congestion developed by RFF to weigh the value of the 
network use (Brunel and al, 2013): valorisation of sur-
plus by discriminatory pricing between peak and off-peak 
hours. The price signal leads to a staggering of circulations 
and a reduction of the concentration coefficient (1.3). The 
given rate is directly inspired by the Japanese model, whose 
observed difference in 2013 was up to 1.3 on the Tokyo-
Osaka line. On the operator standpoint, the hypothesis 
has to be made that the price signal of the infrastructure 
manager is passed on the pricing policy (scarcity effect) 
resulting in an optimised load factor (90%) without parti-
cular change in supply.
The global gain is around 30%, and the saturation dea-
dline postponed by 10 to 25 years. The associated cost of 
such a scenario can also be a gain for the sector, but it feeds 
some social reluctance, if not supported by a deep evolu-
tion of mobility behaviours. The maximisation of surplus 
could indeed lead to a rise in the users’ transport cost, and 
thus a running out-of-course effect. 
Thus, this scenario would be, nowadays, limited by 
the pricing regulation of the state-controlled ticket prices 
(Perennes, 2012) and by the development of intermodal 
competition. 
Conclusion
In conclusion two options can be considered regarding 
the saturation issue: the creation of a new infrastructure, 
despite high investment costs; or the evolution of tools 
and production methods, following an increasing-return 
rationale. The latter scenario could lead to better results 
than the doubling of the line, both in terms of capacity 
and costs. Nevertheless, it supposes a redefinition of the 
operator’s commercial high-speed train supply and the 
introduction of new conditions of exploitation (ERTMS). 
For the infrastructure manager, it means finding the right 
price signal to encourage investments and support the evo-
lution of mobility behaviours. 
The Paris-Lyon HSL case study certainly provides 
the experiment basis for the future of high-speed lines. 
Nevertheless, the capacity increase of the lines might wor-
sen the railway hubs situation, necessitating great invest-
ments, mainly because of their location, in urban areas. 
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, major structural reforms have 
been implemented in most network industries in Europe. 
Driven by the European institutions, the railway transport 
sector in Europe has also gone through both institutional 
and organizational reforms during the last twenty years. 
One of the main objectives of those reforms was to break 
up the national monopolies in order to open up rail mar-
ket services to competition. Directive 91/440/EC1  was 
the first milestone of this process. It introduced a degree 
of vertical separation in the sector by separating the mana-
gement of railway operation and infrastructure from the 
provision of railway transport services which were deemed 
potentially competitive. Considerable attention has been 
devoted by economists to the analysis of gas, telecoms or 
electricity industries but, surprisingly, relativity little no-
tice had been paid to railways so far.
Directive 91/440/EC allows for different degrees 
of vertical separation and, as a consequence, four main 
modes of organization can be found in Europe. A large 
body of the literature in industrial organization analyses 
the pros and cons of vertical separation in network indus-
tries, especially in an industrial economics perspective (e.g. 
Vickers 1995, Sappington2006) comparing the merits of 
the different vertical separation degrees. Yet the coordina-
tion issues between the infrastructure manager (IM) and 
railway undertakings (RUs) have not led to any theore-
tical developments in the railway sector, despite being a 
central matter in the choice of the governance structure 
(Williamson 1985).
The coordination issues in the railway sector have re-
cently been highlighted by the results of a survey conduc-
ted by Merkert and Nash (2013). In particular, the capacity 
allocation process is perceived, along with day-to-day ope-
1 Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community’s 
railways
rations, as the most frequent, intense and complex tran-
saction area. The allocation process is also perceived diffe-
rently if the sector is partly integrated to those countries 
where full separation is in place. Mizutani and Uranishi 
(2013) give empirical evidence that separation becomes 
more costly on the overall efficiency of the system when 
the network is more densely used. In this case network 
density is a proxy for the complexity of the transaction. 
This can be interpreted as a higher need for coordination 
when the complexity of the transaction is growing.
The objective of this paper is to better understand the 
vertical interaction within the railway sector, in order to 
see how coordination can be achieved using prices. In 
order to do so, we study the French allocation process to 
identify the characteristics of coordination in the railway 
sector. In the second section, we develop a simple model 
using the characteristics identified beforehand and find 
that coordination should be achievable using prices if cer-
tain conditions are met when deviating from marginal cost 
pricing.
2. The French capacity allocation process
During the capacity allocation process, capacity made 
available must be matched with the capacity needed. As 
supported by the findings of Merkert and Nash (2013), it 
is a critical part of the interface between network manage-
ment and train operations regarding coordination.
The organization of the French railway sector, which 
is unbundled with delegation of maintenance, highlights 
the fact that the IM is facing not one, but two transac-
tions. There are two types of uses for the capacity on the 
network: commercial use (i.e. to run trains) and mainte-
nance. Regarding maintenance, the objective of the IM is 
to limit both its cost and its capacity consumption. Those 
two objectives are not always compatible. For instance the 
IM can concentrate its maintenance to deploy the main-
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tenance team only once. This way it is less costly but it 
blocks a track segment for a longer time. Another trade-off 
is maintenance at night which is more expensive but has 
less impact on the maximum number of trains running. 
This trade-off takes place during the first out of three 
stages of the capacity allocation process. This first stage 
consists2  of structuring and pre constructing the timetable 
and to define the general maintenance policy. The objec-
tive is to find the long term needs of the operators and 
therefore to reduce the information asymmetry between 
the two.
The second stage is constructing the service timetable 
after the formal requests are made in April, seven months 
before the start of the timetable. Therefore, some requests 
for capacity can still be made up more than one year be-
fore the train effectively runs. Especially for the freight 
transport services this time span means that there is envi-
ronmental uncertainty as it is very difficult for a railway 
operator to forecast its demand for transport services in 
advance. 
One of the issues is that there are many incentives for 
the operators to ask for more than what they need, espe-
cially in the freight market. First of all overbooking may 
occur because operators are anticipating some negative res-
ponses for capacity and want to be sure to have an alterna-
tive route. Secondly, they also have to anticipate for hazard 
during the service. This hazard might be due to technical 
conditions, or may be entailed by the infrastructure mana-
ger changing its maintenance slots. Thirdly, overbooking 
might be a strategic behavior to pre-empt capacity from 
the other operators. 
We refer to the third and last stage as adaptation. 
Interestingly it is during this stage that agreement between 
the infrastructure manager and the operators becomes bin-
ding:  reservation fees will not be reimbursed only if the 
capacity is given back less than 2 months prior to the date 
the train is scheduled to run in order to offer flexibility to 
the operators. During this stage there is trade-off has to be 
made between allocation certainty and flexibility. 
Throughout the description of the French allocation 
capacity process, we want to stress that coordinating the 
need for capacity and its demand is both a long and uncer-
tain process. We want to highlight that during this process 
several trade-offs take place. On the one hand between 
allocation certainty and flexibility, any binding agreement 
is postponed since the upstream and downstream firms 
2 Starting four year before the circulation date.
do not have to commit to one another in terms of quan-
tities. On the other hand the infrastructure manager has 
to choose between lowering the overall cost for maintai-
ning the network and making capacity available. And if 
the network is used more intensely, creating extra capacity 
becomes more costly, and flexibility entails more spillage. 
Therefore our read on the situation is that with vertical 
separation, the cost of coordination arises because of the 
need for flexibility along the allocation process while com-
mitments in specific inputs are made on both sides.
3. The model
III.1 Description of the model
In this section, we develop a simple model to ana-
lyze the coordination issues in the railway sector we have 
described earlier. In order to do so, we use a simple form 
game between the infrastructure manager and one railway 
operator.
Both players have to set their level of production which 
can be either low or high (denoted qL and qH ). As per 
suggested by the normal form game, the level of output 
has to be decided before observing the choice of the other 
player and players are committed to it. Let us denote k the 
marginal cost for producing one extra unit of output for 
the IM, and c the marginal cost for producing an extra 
unit of output for the operator.  In addition, each unit of 
rail services produced requires one unit of capacity. The 
demand for the final good is given by the realization of the 
state of nature that can either be low or high as well. We 
denote π the probability for demand to be high (H) or low 
(L) and the distribution is common knowledge. 
Given the particularity of demand in our model, we 
do not have a smooth match between supply and demand, 
therefore we have to define the following rules: regarding 
the prices, we denote the two mark-ups the railway opera-
tor may levy MuH and MuL with MuH > MuL. The ability 
of a railway operator to levy a mark-up depends both on 
the state of nature and the level of production. More pre-
cisely, a firm may levy a high mark-up if the demand is 
high and if it has produced a high level of output. In other 
cases, we assume that it will only be able to levy the low 
mark-up. Regarding the infrastructure manager, we define 
only one mark-up denoted MuIM, otherwise it is 0. 
In order for quantities to be coordinated, we assume 
that a firm can only adjust its production by selling less 
than it has produced:
1. If a firm played H and the other firm plays L, 
then it has to sell less, that is selling qL instead of qH ;
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2. If a firm played L and the state of nature is H, it 
has to sell at a lower price, that is levying MuL instead of 
MuH (or 0 isntead of Mu
IM in case it is the IM).
We enforce those two rules in order to have market 
clearing.
III.2 Outcome of the game
Given the form of the model, four Nash equilibria 
may arise. We focus on the two uncoordinated equilibria 
that may arise due to the absence of administrative control 
when the firm is separated or its incentives are misaligned. 
In both these outcomes, either the network manager or the 
operator is left with unsold goods which leads to a costly 
coordination between the upstream and downstream enti-
ties and to inefficiency in the railway sector. 
Result 1: Should                                                                then 
no uncoordinated outcome can be a Nash equilibrium.
Result 2: Should                                                                     
then no uncoordinated outcome can be a Nash 
equilibrium.
Result 1 states that we can limit the behaviours of the 
IM leading to inefficient outcomes by bounding its mark-
up. Given that the pricing scheme of the infrastructure 
manager can be reviewed by an independent regulator in 
the European Union, this mark-up can indeed be limited. 
The lower bound corresponds to the amount of incentive 
the IM needs in order to avoid producing low quantities. 
In particular we find that if we rule out the possibility to 
have access charges above marginal prices when the mar-
ket can bear it, then the network manager will never risk 
producing a high amount of capacity. The upper bound is 
needed so that the infrastructure manager does not always 
anticipate high quantities. If the allowed mark-up is too 
high, the regulated monopoly will be over-producing. 
If we consider that the IM can only have prices above 
its marginal cost in order to recover its full cost, as stated 
in Directive 2012/34/EU3 , then an extra condition for 
this result to hold is that the difference between full cost 
and marginal cost be within the bounds of the interval we 
3 Directive 2012/34/EC  establishing a single European railway area
have defined. With full separation, the pricing scheme can 
be an important tool for the regulator to mitigate the risk 
of an uncoordinated outcome to occur as well as indu-
cing the right amount of capacity to be produced on the 
network. 
Result 2 refers to the mark-up of a railway operator. 
Contrary to the IM’s case, the increase of the mark-ups is 
an outcome of the market and cannot be regulated when 
there is downstream competition. The lower bound states 
that the increase in mark-up should cover the uncertain 
increase in costs due to over-producing plus the mark-up 
of the infrastructure manager.
Rewriting the threshold as:
we identify the condition in our model under which 
the downstream market can bear any deviation from mar-
ginal cost pricing for access charges. The mark-up of the 
infrastructure manager becomes harder to bear for the rai-
lway undertakings as their market power decreases.
IV. Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to contribute to the 
debate over the relevance of vertical separation/integration 
in network industries by studying if coordination can be 
achieved using prices in the railway sector.
The nature of the allocation process could lead to 
uncoordinated outcomes. Yet we find that with an effec-
tive price regulation, the regulator may constrain the in-
frastructure manager to choose a coordinated outcome. 
We also derive the condition for the market to bear 
any deviation from marginal cost pricing for the access 
charges. Those are directly related to the market power of 
downstream firms.
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1. Rail transportation in Tanzania
In 2013, Tanzania’s government committed to the 
implementation of one of the first open-access railway sys-
tems in the world (Big Results Now, 2013) as a way to 
ensure adequate level of rail service by 1) allowing efficient 
train operators (TO) to access the infrastructure and ope-
rate train services, and 2) providing sustainable resources 
through access charges to maintain the infrastructure and 
keep the system operative in the future. These objectives 
are critical to prevent future railway systems failures such as 
the 2001 and 2006 Tanzanian railway system concessions 
failures (Olievschi, 2013) that resulted in a major underin-
vestment in rail transportation in the country (Railistics, 
2013). This underinvestment critically impacted the ope-
rating capacity and the reliability of the railway system, 
essential to improving accessibility to the East African 
landlocked countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and 
Western Democratic Republic of Congo (AICD, 2008; 
Amjadi and Yeats, 1995; Arvis et al., 2010; Raballand and 
Macchi, 2009).
However, open-access rail also requires new railway 
regulations that clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
railway institutions and define a capacity pricing scheme 
(Railistics, 2013; World Bank, 2014). This research ana-
lyzes how alternative open-access capacity pricing schemes 
for freight TOs would affect the system level of service and 
the revenues collected to maintain the infrastructure and 
recover capital costs in the context of the Central Corridor 
in Tanzania. Tanzania’s railway system provides a useful 
case to illustrate multiple important concepts to be consi-
dered when implementing a pricing scheme in more com-
plex railway systems.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 
2 presents the main types of capacity pricing schemes and 
discusses the financial model used to determine the beha-
vior of TOs under each scheme. Section 3 presents the 
resulting level of service that container and general cargo 
freight TOs would operate under alternative capacity pri-
cing schemes. Section 4 concludes with some recommen-
dations for open-access capacity pricing schemes. 
2. Capacity pricing schemes for open-access railway 
system
The implementation of an open-access railway system 
requires some level of vertical separation between the TOs 
that operate the trains in the system and collect the reve-
nues selling transportation services to the final customers 
and the infrastructure manager (IM) that maintains and 
manages the infrastructure. Vertical separation requires 
the definition of a capacity pricing scheme that determines 
the access charges that TOs pay to the IM to access and 
use the infrastructure (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003). The IM uses 
these revenues to cover infrastructure costs. The use of the 
state national budget to cover shortfalls is the last resort.
The railway literature proposes three cost-based capa-
city pricing schemes designed to allow the IM to recover 
maximum infrastructure costs: variable access charges, 
two-part tariffs (variable access charges plus a fixed access 
charge), and fixed access charges (Gibson, 2003). Under 
variable access charges, TOs pay some amount per train 
operated; the charge is in general a function of the type of 
train, distance, and tonnage. Under fixed access charges, 
each TO pays an annual lump sum to have a license to 
operate, regardless of the number of trains the TO ope-
rates during the year. 
The practice and the broad economic literature in the 
field recommend the use of variable access charges based 
on marginal cost plus mark-ups (DB, 2009; UIC, 2012; 
World Bank, 2014). However, from an engineering stan-
dpoint, infrastructure related costs in Tanzania are mostly 
independent of the level of service. In other words, the 
short-term and long-term infrastructure marginal cost are 
very low and high mark-ups are required to recover infras-
tructure costs. This research analyzes the implications of 
Capacity pricing schemes to implement open-
access rail in Tanzania
Maite Peña-Alcaraz*, Ignacio Perez-Arriaga, Joseph M. Sussman
 
*Corresponding author: 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Building E40-246, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA; Phone: (+1) 617 803 2182, Fax: (+1) 617 253 7733, Email for 
correspondence: maitepa@mit.edu
dossier
We analyze alternative capacity pricing schemes (access charges) to implement an open-access railway system in Tanzania. We show that the imple-
mentation of variable access charges widely used in the railway industry may result in levels of traffic lower than the traffic operated by an integrated 
railway company. We propose the use of fixed access charges to avoid this problem and discuss the main advantages and disadvantages to implement 
them in the context of multiple freight train services in Tanzania. 
Network Industries Quarterly | vol. 16 | no 2  | 2014
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        19 
resulting alternative pricing schemes for the system. 
For this analysis, we compare the behavior of inde-
pendent TOs with the behavior of an integrated railway 
company (social planner). We assume that both the in-
dependent TOs and the integrated railway company are 
rational agents, i.e. they determine the level of service 
(number of services per direction per week) by maximi-
zing the annual operating margin (operating profits). An 
independent TO would only be interested in operating 
trains if the average annual net cash flow is positive after 
remunerating any invested capital at an adequate rate of 
return (no operation subsidies). 
We use a financial model developed following (PPIAF 
et al., 2011) to determine the integrated railway company, 
independent TO, and IM’s operating margin and cash 
flow for a representative year under different levels of ser-
vice (see World Bank, 2014 for detailed assumptions). The 
integrated railway company faces capital costs associated 
with the investments in railway infrastructure, variable 
costs of operating trains (train lease, personnel, fuel), and 
obtains revenues from transporting freight. The vertically 
separated case is similar: the TO faces cost of accessing the 
tracks (access charges), variable costs of operating trains, 
and obtains revenues from transporting freight. The IM 
faces investment costs in railway infrastructure, mainte-
nance costs, and obtains revenues from access charges.
Investment in railway infrastructure includes $300 
million investment required to rehabilitate the current 
Tanzanian railway system (CPCS, 2013; World Bank, 
2014) plus periodic investment in maintenance. The re-
venues of the TOs are determined multiplying the cargo 
transported (minimum between the capacity of the trains 
operated and the demand) by the shipping rate. Due to the 
strong competition from trucks that offer door-to-door 
transportation services, railway companies have an upper 
limit on the shipping rate they may charge and they have 
low control over the demand that would likely shift to rail. 
The state should facilitate strong intermodal integration 
with the port and with truck companies that provide last 
mile transportation to/from the terminal rail station to 
make rail transportation more attractive and increase the 
utilization of the highly underused railway capacity. 
3. Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss the main results obtained 
for alternative capacity pricing schemes designed to reco-
ver maintenance and financial infrastructure costs and to 
ensure that TOs can viably operate (positive profits) in 
Tanzania in two scenarios: 1) considering only container 
TOs, and 2) considering both container and general cargo 
(non-container freight) TOs. 
3.1. Container traffic
Figure 1 shows the annual operating margin and the 
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cash flow for an independent container TO, for the IM, 
and for an integrated railway company in Tanzania under 
variable and fixed access charges when no other type of 
TO operate in the line. Both access charges have been cal-
culated to recover as much of the infrastructure costs as 
possible, while ensuring that the operating margin and the 
net cash flow of the independent TO are positive. Note 
that it is not possible to recover all the infrastructure cost 
($22.9 million per year in Tanzania) only with container 
services. The maximum charges that an independent TO 
could viably pay are $0.035 per ton-km (variable) or $19.1 
million per year (fixed). We compute these numbers esti-
mating the TO maximum revenues, the variable and fixed 
costs, and therefore the maximum fixed and variable access 
charges that the TO can viably pay to achieve an annual 
net cash flow equal to zero. 
The results also show that under only variable access 
charges, a rational independent TO would operate only 
two trains per direction per week while the social planner 
would operate four. This mismatch happens because when 
the social planner tries to maximize its operating margin, 
it operates a train when the additional revenues produced 
are higher than the additional variable costs (train lease, 
personnel and fuel). For the social planner, most infras-
tructure investment cost is a sunk cost: it is already made 
and it is independent of the level of service. Under variable 
access charges in contrast, the infrastructure costs are char-
ged as variable costs for TOs. Therefore, a rational TO 
would only operate a train if the additional revenues pro-
duced are higher than the true variable costs plus a share 
of the infrastructure cost that appears now as an artificial 
variable cost (the variable access charge). 
Under fixed access charges, the infrastructure costs are 
charged as a fixed cost for TOs. Therefore, this cost will 
also be a sunk cost for the TO. Consequently, the TO will 
operate a train when additional revenues produced are 
higher than the true variable operation costs and there is 
no mismatch with the level of service of the social planner. 
 3.2. Container and general cargo traffic
The previous subsection considers container traffic 
because container shippers have high willingness to pay to 
ship containers. Nonetheless, there is plenty unused capa-
city in the Tanzanian railway system and there are other 
types of customers interested in transporting non-contai-
nerized freight (general cargo) along the corridor. We car-
ried out a similar analysis of costs and revenues for general 
cargo services (World Bank, 2014) 0 per ton-kilometer 
(variable) or $10.5 million per year (fixed). In both cases 
an integrated railway company and an independent TO 
would operate ten services per week. 
Considering these numbers, the IM would need to 
charge a variable access charge of $0.023 per ton-kilo-
meter (variable) or $12.4 million per year (fixed) to the 
container TO to recover all infrastructure costs. Note that 
if the container TO was charged only $10.5 million per 
year or $0.010 per ton-km it would not be able to reco-
ver infrastructure costs (only $21.0 and $15.9 million per 
year respectively). This shows, first of all, that discriminate 
pricing would be needed to recover infrastructure costs. 
Although a general cargo TO cannot viably pay as much 
as a container TO per ton to access the infrastructure, al-
lowing access to the infrastructure to general cargo TOs 1) 
allows the IM to recover infrastructure costs (not possible 
only with container TOs), 2) allows container TOs to pay 
lower charges to access the infrastructure, and 3) improves 
welfare (for general cargo TOs and general cargo shippers) 
from a state point of view. 
Although these charges are consistent with the industry 
benchmark (World Bank, 2014), a regulator needs consi-
derable information (operation costs, demand estimates) 
to determine the maximum access charges that each TO is 
able to pay. Lower charges would not allow the IM to re-
cover infrastructure costs; higher charges (particularly for 
general cargo in this case) would not allow TOs to viably 
operate trains in the system. 
With a variable access charge of $0.023 per ton-kilo-
meter, an independent container TO would only operate 
three (note that the variable charges are now lower than 
in 3.1.) train services per direction per week (instead of 
the four that a social planner would operate). Under fixed 
access charges, the level of service of independent TOs in 
equilibrium matches the level of service that an integra-
ted railway company would operate. The main challenge 
to implement fixed access charges in this case consists of 
determining the share of infrastructure costs ($22.9 mil-
lion per year) that each TO should pay. Nonetheless, our 
computation shows that the level of service operated by 
the TOs is robust when the distribution of fixed access 
charges change: the container and the general cargo TO 
would be able to pay up to $19.1 million and $10.5 mil-
lion per year respectively while still being profitable. Any 
choice such that the annual fixed access charge for the 
container TO is lower than or equal to $19.1 million, for 
the general cargo TO is lower than or equal to $10.5 mil-
lion, and the sum of both charges is $22.9 million would 
improve level of service with respect to variable charges 
while enabling infrastructure cost recovery. This result has 
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important implications: 1) it relaxes the constraint on how 
much information the regulator needs to determine fixed 
access charges, and 2) it allows the regulator to design the 
fixed charge level for TOs with different objectives: such 
as ensure equity, ensure efficiency, ensure general cargo 
services.
Under fixed access charges with no variable charges per 
train, states could implement different schemes to allocate 
operating licenses among potential TOs. First, the regu-
lator could determine a fee (fixed access charge) that a 
container and a general cargo TO would have to pay to 
get the license to recover infrastructure costs ($22.9 mil-
lion per year). If the charges allow the operators to viably 
operate, they would apply for the license and retain the 
additional profits ($19.1 or $10.5 million per year minus 
access charge for each type of TO). Second, when there are 
several companies willing to operate trains, the state could 
implement an auction to allocate the license to operate 
in each market. If the license is awarded to the TO with 
higher willingness to pay at each market, the most effi-
cient container and general cargo TOs would bid $19.1 
and $10.5 million respectively. In this case, the publicly 
owned IM would obtain $29.6 million per year (instead 
of $22.9). The IM can either use the additional revenues 
to invest in infrastructure in the future or transfer them 
to the government. If the license is awarded to the TOs 
that offer best shipping rate to customers provided that the 
IM can recover infrastructure costs, the IM would recover 
$22.9 million per year, the TOs would recover their costs 
with some return, and the customers would benefit from 
a discount in their shipping rate of $6.7 million per year 
($29.6 minus $22.9). Further options can be explored 
when more than one license per market (container and 
general cargo) are allocated.
4. Conclusions
In this article, we analyze different capacity pricing 
schemes designed to recover infrastructure costs (periodic 
maintenance and financial costs) and to ensure that TOs 
can viably operate (positive net cash flow) in Tanzania. The 
insights derived from this case are useful to design open-
access railway systems in other countries. 
First of all, we show that the adoption of variable ac-
cess charges widely used in the railway industry may create 
incentives for rational TOs to operate fewer trains than 
an integrated railway company (social planner). We show 
that the use of fixed access charges aligns the behavior of 
vertically separated firms with the behavior of an integra-
ted railway company. This result is important in the rai-
lway industry because most infrastructure costs are fixed, 
i.e., for the most part they do not vary with the level of 
service as is generally assumed. 
The results obtained also show that: 1) discriminate 
pricing may be needed to be able to recover infrastruc-
ture costs when different types of TOs face very different 
levels of cost and revenues, 2) regulators need considerable 
information about the sector (demand and cost) to deter-
mine adequate access charge levels that TOs can viably 
pay, 3) the level of service offered by TOs is robust for a 
wide range of fixed access fees, relaxing the regulator needs 
of information, 4) different levels of fixed access charges 
can be designed with different objectives, and 5) the state 
choice of different capacity pricing schemes has implica-
tions on the welfare distribution among stakeholders. 
Future work should analyze further how to implement 
fixed access charges effectively, especially in cases with 
competing TOs in the same market to avoid barriers to 
entry. Future research should also determine how these 
conclusions change with demand uncertainty, elasticity in 
the demand, and imperfect information, in instances in 
which infrastructure capacity is limited or there are im-
portant network effects in the system, and in instances in 
which the capacity of the regulator is limited. 
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announcements
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulati on
The Florence School of Regulati on (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the 
European University Insti tute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). 
Since then, the Florence School of Regulati on has expanded from Energy regulati on to Telecommu-
nicati ons and Media (2009), Transport (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulati on (FSR Transport) is concerned with the 
regulati on of all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relati onship among 
them). It currently focuses on regulati on and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban 
public transport, intermodal transport, as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated ﬁ rms, regulators and the European Commission 
by way of stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to acti vely contribute to the evoluti on of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core acti vity of FSR Transport is the organizati on of policy events, where representati ves of the 
European Commission, regulatory authoriti es, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics 
in the ﬁ eld meet to shape regulatory policy in matt ers of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s acti viti es are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers 
and academic publicati ons. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR 
Transport webpage, as they aim to involve professors, young academics and practi ti oners to be-
come part of a unique open platf orm for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.ﬂ orence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
FSR-Transport: Events 2014
Date Title
3-4 July 2014 10 years of Florence School of Regulation conference
3 October 2014 6th Florence Air Forum 
27 October 2014 5th Florence Urban Forum 
28 November 2014 9th Florence Rail Forum 
For more informati on about our acti viti es please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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